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ABSTRACT

The concept of one-to-one associations between specific items of material culture
and specific ethnic groups has been met with a great degree of enthusiasm among
historical archaeologists, particularly those engaged in African-American archaeological
research. There has been comparatively little methodological evaluation, however, of the
construct of “ethnicity” as an active agent in shaping material culture patterns. This
oversight has resulted in tautological arguments rooted in biased data selection and
unrecognized logical errors in the hypotheses designed to ask questions concerning
ethnicity and material culture. Using formal models of social scientific theory
construction, I will address this problem through the methodological “unpacking” of
ethnicity as it is used in archaeological analysis, particularly as applied to South’s pattern
analysis model, with specific examples taken from Vernon Baker’s seminal study of Black
Lucy’s Garden in Andover, Massachusetts, and John Otto’s monograph on Cannon’s
Point Plantation in Georgia. I plan to make suggestions for the qualitative expansion of
the archaeological data base, using socio-economic as well as ethnic criteria, to provide a
more rounded picture of material culture patterning. I will also make recommendations
for an increased specificity in historical and social research as a means to grasp more
tightly the concept and process of ethnic identification.
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Introduction

This paper is an attempt to clarify some of the issues surrounding current
attempts to delineate African-American ethnicity in the archaeological record.
Given the amount of theoretical attention that historical archaeologists have
focused on the subject within the past two decades, there has been surprisingly
little methodological evaluation of the use of “ethnicity” as an active agent in the
formation of material culture. This inattention has led to poorly constructed
theories tested with even more poorly executed methodological questions, and has
obscured the nature of ethnic identification and the processes which shape it.
Chapter I examines the definition and role of “science” in archaeology and
how the relative rigidity or flexibility of its interpretation structures archaeological
inquiry. In Chapter II, historical archaeology is firmly embedded as a “social
science” and a basic glossary of terms and applicable methodologies for the
construction of strong social scientific theory is provided.
Chapter III reviews the anthropological concept of ethnicity and many of
the theoretical conflations and contradictions subsumed by the term, particularly as
it applies to African-American identity. The use and abuse of South’s pattern
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analysis in ethnic interpretation is addressed in Chapter IV, with a specific
emphasis on its theoretical misuse in relation to culture versus culture process, and
how that misuse has been extended to incorporate the process of ethnogenesis. In
Chapter V, all of the above information is brought to bear on the analysis of
Vernon Baker’s archaeological interpretation of Black Lucy’s Garden, an AfricanAmerican site in Andover, Massachusetts and John Otto’s monograph on
Cannon’s Point Plantation. The problem with the theory of unique AfricanAmerican behaviors as reflected in unique ceramic patterns is addressed through
the “unpacking” of ethnicity as an explanatory concept and demonstrates how the
resultant co-variation of economic and racial variables render the theory untenable.
Suggestions for improved theory construction through a better rounded, less biased
data base are also provided. Chapter 6 provides a cautionary look at the role of
economics in defining ethnicity and recommends increased specificity in historical
and social research as a means to understand better exactly what is represented by
the concept and process of ethnic identification.
In the final analysis, this paper will raise more research questions than it
can answer about the nature of African-American ethnicity and how it is best
identified in the archaeological record. I hope that through the examination of
social scientific theory construction and the methodological problems which it
helps to illuminate, it will provide a cogent and clearheaded means to circumvent
those problems.

Chapter I. Historical Archaeologists: “Scientists” or “Aimless Balladeers”?

For well over a generation an archaeological debate has raged as to the
relative merits of processual, or scientific, method and theory versus postprocessual, or interpretivist, models of archaeological explanation. The analysis
of “ethnicity” in the archaeological record, particularly that of African-Americans,
has fallen prey to this dichotomous situation. Historical archaeologists are caught
between, on the one hand, a desire for a deep “interpretivist” discussion of the
roles of Africans in the New World (Yentsch 1994; Ferguson 1992), and, on the
other, a more rigorous, “scientific” approach to the illumination of those lives
through the use of pattern analyses, sherd counts and statistics (Otto 1984;
Armstrong 1990). Unfortunately, as Posnansky (1989) and Sanford (1996) have
pointed out, we have a long way to go as anthropologists before we can consider
ourselves even nominally “immersed” in the culture and history of Africans and
African Americans. Furthermore, as scientists, our attempts to understand
manifestations of ethnicity in the archaeological record through the formulation of
clear, determinate research designs, the hallmark of good scientific research, have
provided questionable results at best (Otto 1984; Baker 1978; Zierden and
Calhoun 1983).
4
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This situation is largely the product of the polemics surrounding the
intellectual status of archaeology, generally, and historical archaeology,
specifically. As the argument is familiar to anyone working in the field, it requires
no further elaboration here; it is worth noting, however, that much of this tension
is aggravated by an overly rigid understanding of the word “science” and its
application.
Two basic working assumptions o f practicing scientists are that there is a
real, knowable world that can be empirically perceived and described and
that the empirically observable behaviors o f the entities making up the real
world is orderly (Watson et a l 1984: 3).
Archaeological Explanation, written by Patty Jo Watson, Steven LeBlanc
and Charles Redman, provides the most explicit discussion available on the role of
scientific method and theory in archaeology. The authors charge archaeological
analyses with the role of explanation, which they define as the demonstration that
a particular case one wants to explain is an example of general relationships
described by an established general law. Science, they argue,
is deterministic and scientists assume that general laws can be confirmed
\

that will allow the explanation and prediction o f the behavior o f all
empirically observable phenomena (Watson et al 1984:4).
This definition is expanded by adding that
Random variation is only that portion o f the world fo r which we have no
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explanation. The division between systematic and stochastic variation is
imposed by the analyst and depends on what explanatory variables are
available and included in the analysis. Given the right explanatory
variables, the world is entirely predictable (King et al. 1994:59).
While explanation certainly must remain the primary goal of archaeology, it
does not follow that so rigid a definition of science as that cited by Watson et al.
necessarily must govern such explanation. Arguably, this definition of science
envisions a world in which all human behavior is predictable, and that element of
behavior which is unpredictable is only unpredictable insofar as that proportion of
its unknown constituent variables. Human agency is lost in this picture and the
notion of a generalized' creative, non-systematic predictability of variation and
change in human culture is subsumed under a model of specific, routinized,
systematic predictability.
Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba offer another option to
the deterministic model of science in their book, Designing Social Inquiry:
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Their model allows for the existence
of a probabalistic world, one in which
Random variation exists in nature and the social and political worlds and
can never be eliminated. Even i f we measured all variables without error,
collected a census (rather than only a sample) o f data, and included every
conceivable explanatory variable, our analysis would still never generate
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perfect predictions. A researcher can divide the world into systematic and
non-systematic components and often improve on predictions, but nothing
a researcher does to analyze data can have any effect on reducing the
fundamental amount o f non-systematic variation existing in various parts o f
the empirical world (King et al. 1994:59).
While this definition may read as the counter to Watson’s notion of science,
perpetuating rather than reconciling the processual/post-processual,
science/humanities dichotomy, it is rather more flexible in its applicability. King
et al. endorse a systematized collection and organization of data rooted firmly in
the “scientific” tradition, but tacitly accept the notion that the interpretive and
predictive powers of this data will always be a variable function of the specific and
unique characteristics of the time and place from which the data were collected.
This is not to suggest that every event, archaeological or otherwise, is
absolutely unique or, more properly, not amenable to some level of predictive
generalization. If this were the case, than postdiction (Watson et al. 1984:6), or
predictions about the past, would be impossible and historical archaeology in fact
would be nothing more than “a mere handmaiden to history” (Noel Hume 1975:3).
Indeed, as one historian has commented,
i f the emphasis on “uniqueness ” is carried to the extreme o f ignoring all
regularities, the very possibility o f social science is denied, and historians
are reduced to the aimlessness ofballadeers (E.L. Jones in King et al.
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1994:43).
The word “historian” only need be replaced with “historical archaeologist”
for the sentiment to apply with equal force to our own discipline.
It is ironic that many social scientists, but most remarkably archaeologists,
have set for themselves a sterner task in the definition of science than do most
“hard” scientists. Anthony O ’Hear has remarked of the physical sciences that
...we have to insist that proposing and testing universal theories is only part
o f the aim o f science. There may be no true universal theories, owing to
conditions differing markedly through time and space; this is a possibility
we cannot overlook. But even i f this were so, science could still fulfil [sic]
many o f its aims in giving us knowledge and true predictions about
conditions in and around our spatio-temporal niche (O 'Hear 1989:43).
Historical archaeologists must contend with the complexities of an infinite
variety of spatio-temporal niches, each contingent on any number o f internal and
external variables. Out of these possibilities they must try to extract some
generalizing principle so that meaningful questions can be asked of the
archaeological record. Even Watson et al.’s belief in a deterministic and entirely
predictable world is confounded by the notion of variation, although the concept is
not acknowledged explicitly. The authors comment
in practice, one can usually fin d reasons fo r concluding that some “In C, if
A, then B ” assertions express deterministic or causal connections, while
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others reflect only contingent or accidental relations (Watson et a l
1994:7).
The challenge is to devise a method to distinguish between “accidents” and
“causalities” in the archaeological record, knowing what represents a meaningful
relationship between artifact and behavior and what represents only coincidence,
contingency or irrelevancy.

Chapter II. The Prom ise of a “Social Scientific” Approach

Historical archaeology is understood (professionally, if not popularly) to
operate within the realm of the social sciences. Yet despite this disciplinary self
recognition, there seems to be little or no stated consensus as to what exactly the
methodology of historical archaeology as a social science should be. Max
Weber’s 1949 classic, The Methodology o f the Social Sciences, provides a
comprehensive examination of the philosophical underpinnings of social scientific
inquiry, namely “ethical neutrality”, “objectivity”, and the “logic of the cultural
sciences”, but provides little in the way o f practicable methodological guidance.
Watson et al. in Archaeological Explanation eschew the term social science in
favor of the word science, leaving the reader to wonder how archaeology differs in
its aims and methods from mechanical engineering or podiatry. Introductory texts
on archaeology may or may not refer to the field as a social science, and those that
do invariably fail to offer any concise definition of the term (e.g. Bamouw
1989:11-13; Fagan 1996:2; Meighan 1966:1-5; Renfrew 1996:11-13).
It is only in turning to the Oxford English Dictionary (1989), that a clear
definition can be found. Social science in the OED is defined as
The scientific study o f the structure andfunctions o f society; any discipline
10

11

that attempts to study human society, either as a whole or in part, in a
systematic way
in distinction to science which is defined as
A branch o f study which is concerned either with a connected body o f
demonstrated truths or with observed facts systematically classified and
more or less colligated by being brought under general laws, and which
includes trustworthy methods fo r the discovery o f new truth within its own
domain.
The point of this seemingly hair-splitting semantical distinction is to
suggest that in the absence of an explicit definition of archaeology as a social
science, a science expressly concerned with the study of human society, a critical
aspect of theory construction in archaeology is often overlooked.
A fundamental truth of the nature of knowledge and the process of
inference is the notion that all conclusions derived from the scientific method are
inherently uncertain. This precept, also called the fundamental problem o f causal
research ( King et al. 1994:79), acknowledges the fact that we will never know a
causal inference for certain as any theory designed to show a causal relationship is
a distillation of systematic and non-systematic variables from an infinite universe
of such variables.
By failing to stress the human aspect of archaeological inquiry, that infinite
universe of possible variables is methodologically truncated. Archaeology as
science potentially reduces individual and societal variation as laundry list of
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utilitarian wants or needs. A.M. Hocart commented that, “Utility dominates the
study of culture because it dominates the culture that studies” (Sahlins 1978:36)
and the truth of this criticism is evident in many “settlement system” and “resource
procurement” models within the New Archaeology paradigm.
This is more than a mere intellectual point. The recognition of archaeology
as social science is vital to the construction of coherent social scientific models,
particularly in historical archaeology. If we accept that the goal of archaeology is
the development of theories of explanatory inference about the past, and if the
reduction of uncertainty in those explanatoiy inferences is the primary substantive
improvement to such theories, than human behavior, in all of its manifestations,
must be addressed specifically in order to control for and predict patterns in the
past. A rigidly scientific approach to archaeology often amounts to a reductionist,
determinist perspective on human behavior. This perspective on culture and the
archaeological remains of culture is not only intuitively false, but can lead to
profound errors in research methodology and, subsequently, profound errors in the
theoretical conclusions derived from those methodologies.
As Ferejohn has pointed out,
We want social science theories to provide causal explanations o f events...
(and) to give account o f the reasons fo r or meanings o f social action. We
want to know not only what caused the agent to perform some act but also
the agent's reasons fo r taking the action (Ferejohn 1993:124).
Barbara J. Little, in her 1994 article, People with History: An Update on
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Historical Archaeology in the United States, makes that point that methodology
remains the primary stumbling block to the process of asking “questions that
count” in historical archaeology. She argues that while there are many examples
of procedural or technical methodologies which serve to structure the current
questions being asked in the field, there is a dearth of method informed by theory
that is structured to ask those questions in a unique way (Little 1994:13).
I would backtrack a bit and suggest that a critical reevaluation of much of
the methodology currently being used to answer some of those questions would
be of great utility. This re-evaluation is most profitably approached at the level of
basic social scientific theory construction.
Many of the long-lived and deep-rooted problems in historical
archaeological research are the result of tautological arguments created and
perpetuated by indeterminate research designs. A research design is a plan that
shows, through a discussion of a model and its constituent data, how one can
expect to use the collected evidence to make inferences concerning a specific
problem (King et al. 1994:118). It is the process of arriving at a descriptive
inference through a well-executed research design that is the ultimate goal of
social scientific theory.
Descriptive inference is the method of understanding an unobserved
phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations, and relies on the identification
of systematic and non-systematic factors present in the phenomenon or set of

14

phenomena that the researcher is attempting to understand (King et al. 1994:34).
An observation, in this context, refers to one measure on one unit for one
dependent, or outcome, variable and includes information on the values of the
explanatory variables, which can encompass control variables and a key causal
variable (King et al. 1994:117).
Related to, but often erroneously interchanged with, the notion of
descriptive inference is the concept of causality. Causal theories are designed to
show the causes of a phenomenon or set of phenomena by positing relationships
between assigned variables that create observable implications (King et al.
1994:77, 99-100). Causality and causal theories are part of the process of
descriptive inference and, as theories, are constructed to be tested using either
inductive or deductive methods. Unfortunately, much of the implementation of
causal theory concerning culture process in the archaeological record stops short
of rigorous testing and many of the hypotheses which constitute the theories are
structurally unsound due to imprecise understandings of the rules for constructing
causal theory.
There are five fundamental rules in the construction of causal theory.
While many of them are basic, historical archaeologists’ lack of adherence to these
rules has contributed greatly to the incoherence within the field concerning pattern
analysis and ethnicity and the supposed causal links between the two.
The first rule is always to construct falsifiable theories (King et al.

1994:100-105). A researcher should always ask what evidence would falsify a
given theory, and recognize that the process is designed to ensure that the theory
always remains tentative and does not become dogma. Karl Popper, a pre-eminent
philosopher of science, went so far as to suggest that the verification of a theory is
almost irrelevant to its falsification (Popper 1968:252). While it certainly is true
that no theory is completely verifiable as one can never test all of the possible
observable implications of the theory, the evaluation of any theory should not be
merely the attempt to falsify it. Nearly every social scientific theory is falsifiable
on one level or another, but the process of falsification should be viewed as a
means to define the applicable bounds of the theory, not as grounds for its
immediate dismissal.
The second rule in constructing causal theory is to build theories that are
internally consistent (King et al. 1994:105-107). Inconsistencies, defined as the
generation of two or more hypotheses which contradict one another within a single
theory, render the theory not only falsifiable but unequivocally false. When this
situation occurs, there is no amount of evidence from the empirical world which
can support the claims made by the theory and it should be tossed out.
Third, the selection of dependent, or outcome variables, should be made
very carefully. The dependent variable always should be, by definition,
dependent, meaning that it does not cause changes in the explanatory variables, a
common problem in qualitative research design known as endogeneity (King et al.
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1994:197-198).
As a hypothetical example of this problem, suppose an archaeologist wishes
to postdict the likelihood of armed conflict among Native Americans and EuroAmericans based on the relative number of gun-smithing sites across a range of
colonial townships. The explanatory variable in this formula would be the number
of gun-smithing sites within towns of equal size and economy; the dependent
variable would be the presence/absence of armed conflict between English
colonists and the local native populations. The problem with this approach is that
the number of gun-smithies within a given town is not necessarily a random
phenomenon, but represents a self-assigned variable, a variable influenced by a
pre-existing, town-wide perception of the threat of native attack. In other words,
the anticipation of conflict by a colonial community, in essence the dependent
variable, directly affected the number of guns and gun makers, the explanatory
variable, that the community chose to support.
A corollary to the point of endogeneity is the maintenance of conditional
independence, the assumption that observations are chosen and values assigned to
the explanatory variables independently of the values taken by the dependent
variable (King et al. 1994:115). If the explanatory variables are chosen by criteria
that are correlated with the dependent variable, than the theory is unsound.
Consider the example of a site settlement analysis of 17th-century Native
Americans in southern New England in which an archaeologist wishes to
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demonstrate the effect of segregated living patterns between Pequot Indians and
European colonists on the Christian conversion rates among the Pequots. The
conditional independence assumption would be violated if the archaeologist only
examined the association between two variables, Pequot site location in relation to
European settlements and conversion to Christianity, to determine their causal
relationship. The proposition that Pequots who lived among and interacted daily
with the larger white community converted to Christianity versus those Pequots
who lived in isolated, insular villages and maintained traditional worldviews may
be confusing physical location with ideology. The reason for this is that those
natives who settled among the Europeans may have done so out of a conscious
choice to convert to Christianity as opposed to those natives who chose to settle
away from European centers as a strategy to preserve their traditional belief
systems.
In this instance, what the researcher may be measuring are degrees of
ideological resistance/acceptance among Pequots to Christian conversion efforts
rather than the effect of presumptively random Pequot settlement patterns on that
conversion. The effect of location could be addressed, in theory, if sites which
comprised Pequot communities with roughly similar attitudes toward Christian
conversion could be located in both segregated and de-segregated contexts, and the
attendant conversion rates then measured.
The selection of observations based on the dependent variable so that the
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dependent variable remains constant is also an obvious source of bias to be
avoided (King et al. 1994:108). When a researcher chooses a particular
phenomenon to study and chooses only those observations in which the dependent
variable reflects that phenomenon, than nothing substantive can be learned of the
actual causes of that phenomenon. For example, if an archaeologist wished to
understand the environmental factors which encouraged limited horticulture
among Late Archaic Native American populations in the Northeast, but chose only
those sites on which farming was known to have been practiced, than those
associated environmental conditions are of little predictive value. Of more value
would be to select sites where horticulture did not occur but where the prevailing
environmental factors were similar to other sites where the phenomenon did
develop. In this way, the archaeologist may reassess the explanatory variables
within the hypothesized causal relationship between environment and horticulture
and generate more fine-tuned theories as to the relationship between the two.
Finally, the dependent variable chosen should be representative of the
variation one wishes to explain (King et al. 1994:108-109). Again, an obvious
point, but in the process of any research design it is valuable to take a step back
and make sure that it is, in fact, the variation of the dependent variable which is of
interest and not the background factors that the design holds constant. Returning
again to the Pequot example, suppose an historical archaeologist wanted to explain
patterns in the material culture remains of Christianized Pequots; namely, why

there appear to be such profound differences in the levels of material consumption
from household to household within a single community. Such criterion as family
structure and size, employment levels, and accessibility to external markets may
all be taken into account to explain the observed discrepancies and hopefully
would provide a workable inferential model for the analysis of future assemblages.
If, however, the effect of the presence/absence of Christian conversion on the
material culture assemblages was the explanatory variable of interest, than the
design would be flawed as that variable would not vary within an entirely
Christianized native community. In order to assess the effect of Christianization
on native assemblages, non-Christianized communities similar in all other socio
economic respects would need to be included in the data base.
Fourth, in constructing a causal theory it is always important to maximize
the concreteness of the theoretical question being asked (King et al. 1994:109112). This requires choosing observable, precise concepts rather than
unobservable, vague concepts whenever possible - the mortal sin of tautology
looms large when fuzzy dependent variables are predicted by even fuzzier
explanatory variables. Among the more imprecise concepts listed by the authors
of Designing Social Research is “culture”, a situation which poses an obvious
problem for archaeologists. Abstract concepts such as “culture”, “ethnicity”, or
“status” render explanatory theories suspect unless those concepts can be
measured independently of the dependent variable one is trying to explain.
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Realistically, however, unobservable constructs such as “culture” or
“ethnicity” often are used in the construction of causal theory in archaeology, as
these are most often the anthropological issues in which archaeologists are most
interested. Consequently, indicators, in the form of artifacts, are selected as
observable manifestations of the concept under examination. That there exists a
gap between concept and indicator is inevitable - it is only when “the indicator,
which may only bear scant relation to the concept if any relation at all, is reified
and labeled with the abstract concept itself’ (King et al. 1994:111), that grave
theoretical problems arise. The relationship between concept and indicator is not,
in and of itself, at fault, but the degree of association that a researcher assigns
between the two may be. A careful and consistent theoretical distinction between
concept and indicator is necessary to maintain a viable theory.
Concreteness also should extend to the words used to describe a theory.
Both the description and implication of the theory should be stated in precise
language which, ideally, leaves little room for interpretation or ambiguity. As
James Deetz noted in Flowerdew Hundred’ “it is often better to risk being wrong
than to retreat into timid equivocation” (Deetz 1993:45).
Fifth, and last of the rules for causal theory construction, is the principle
that theories should be stated in as encompassing ways as possible. Those
systematic features of the theory that it make applicable in other areas should be
stated and then, of course, the theory should be tested in all of its applications. So
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long as the theory remains testable, than the broader the better; that is, the broader,
the greater the leverage of the theory over the stated problem (King et.al.
1994:113-114).
Maximizing leverage, or explaining as much as possible with as little as
possible, is one of the keys to developing strong theory. The principle of leverage,
as distinct from the more common term parsimony, provides a uniquely productive
perspective from which to evaluate social scientific theory.
Parsimony, as defined by Jeffreys (1961:47), posits that simple theories
have higher prior possibilities. Parsimony, therefore, implies a fundamental
judgement or assumption about the nature of the world, namely that the world is a
simple place (King et al. 1994:20). Unfortunately, the social sciences deal with
anything but a simple world - the mission o f most social science is to reduce the
world’s massive complexity into interpretively manageable units.
Leverage, or explanatory potential, acknowledges complexity and is more
appropriate to social scientific research. Leverage requires only a parity of
explanation and prediction, that statements of explanation are logically equivalent
to statements of prediction in any given case (Watson et al. 1982:5). Whether
many explanatory variables are necessary to meet this condition or whether true
parsimony can be achieved merely indicates whether the researcher has a lower or
higher degree of leverage over a particular problem (King et al. 1994:104-105).
Exceptions added to a theory are acceptable, but reduce the leverage of the theory
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to a given problem. Too many exceptions and a “theory” may become little more
than a useless composite of exceptions and exclusions - at that point is may be
necessary to discard the theory in its entirety.
These five rules are designed to safeguard against the construction of
indeterminate research designs, designs from which virtually nothing can be
learned about the causal hypothesis (King et al. 1994:118). A major source of
indeterminate research design lies in the biased selection of observations with
which a causal theory is constructed. Ideally, the best “intentional” design selects
observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable, as well as any control
variables, without regard to the values of the outcome variable (King et al.
1994:140). Observation selection and strong theory construction go hand in hand,
and often a deficiency in the former leads to in the latter. There are cases,
however, where selection bias is far more subtle in its implications, offering no
direct obstacle to theory building but nonetheless rendering a theory logically
inconsistent. As King et al. warn,
since selection criteria in qualitative research are often implicit and
selection is often made without any self-conscious attempt to evaluate
potential biases, there are many opportunities to allow bias subtly to
intrude on our selection procedures (128).
Multicollinearity, a term borrowed from statistical sciences, occurs when
one explanatory variable can be perfectly predicted from one or more of the
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remaining explanatory variables (King et al. 1994:122-124). Often
multicollinearity occurs, whether by design or chance, when a small data set is
used and two or more causal hypotheses, which may be conceptually distinct from
one another, are perfectly correlated. Causality is confounded in this situation as
the two component hypotheses meant to test the observable implications of a
causal theory cannot be analytically separated from each other. For example,
suppose an archaeologist hypothesizes that 1) 18th-century Native Americans are
more likely than 18th-century whites to structure their diets around venison and 2)
People of limited economic means are more likely to have a venison-based diet
than those with more money. The observations available to test these hypotheses,
however, consist only of 18th-century sites known to be occupied by poor Indians
and, conversely, sites known to have been occupied by wealthy whites. In this
instance, the causal effects of the hypotheses cannot be meaningfully assessed as
they cannot be separated given the limitations of the data base.
Another error in qualitative research design is the selection of observations
on both the explanatory and dependent variables so that the two vary together in
ways that are known to be consistent with the hypothesis that the research purports
to test (King et al. 1994:142). This is not necessarily a deliberate or dishonest
attempt to skew causal inferences in one direction or the other. More often, it is a
result of a circumscribed data base, particularly if most of the available data, or
observations, are related to the dependent variable (King et al. 1994:132).
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Returning to the example above, if an archaeologist hypothesizes that 18thcentury Native Americans were more likely to consume venison than 18th-century
European Americans, but gathers all data from an isolated, traditional, rural
Reservation context due to a lack of excavated sites elsewhere, than any
conclusions drawn from that data will be flawed. Arguably, the socio-economic
and political context of the sites within that Reservation, by definition a Native
American community, will skew predictions favorably toward the researcher’s
proposed hypothesis.
Omitted variable bias is one of the most common errors in research design
and one of the more dangerous. In dealing with a complex world and in
attempting to causally explain that world with the most leverage, many social
scientists attempt to introduce the fewest number of explanatory variables into
their theories as possible. While this is an important consideration, a theory has
little explanatory force if the omission of critical variables can produce substantive
changes in the hypothesized causal relationship. In evaluating an explanatory
variable for inclusion or omission, omission is obviously feasible if it has no
effect on the outcome variable. Likewise, an explanatory variable can be omitted
safely even if it does have a strong effect on the dependent variable so long as it
does not co-vary with any of the other included explanatory variables (King et al.
1994:169). Co-variation within a single hypothesis is similar in effect to
multicollinearity between hypotheses, and similarly confounds causal theory

25

construction.
Back to the venison example, let’s say that a certain archaeologist proposes
that 18th-century Natives relied heavily on deer meat in their diet as evidenced by
a predominance of deer bones in 18th-century Native faunal assemblages. While
this seems to be an assertion supported by the facts, another look at the data by a
second researcher uncovers a flaw in methodology. Upon careful re-examination,
the researcher finds that while, indeed, there is a predominance of deer bone in the
faunal assemblages, there seems to be a bias in the data set. A majority of the sites
containing appreciable faunal assemblages were excavated without the use of
screens. In this case, the omitted variable of recovery method strongly biased the
results toward larger, more visible deer bones to the exclusion of smaller, less
easily recovered bones such as fish or bird and thus biased the conclusion of the
primacy of deer meat in Native diets.
Research design and causal theory construction are as critical to
archaeological research as they are to any other social scientific discipline. The
analysis of the relationship between artifacts and the people who produced them is
both a quantitative exercise (sherd and minimum vessel counts, pipestem formulas,
mean ceramic dates), and a qualitative exercise (What meaning did particular
vessels have to an individual or society? How did tobacco impact socio-economic
relationships in Virginia? When did capitalism start exerting observable
influences on the material culture record?).
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O f particular interest to historical archaeologists in recent years is the role
of ethnic or racial self-identification in the patterning of material culture. The
manifestation of ethnicity in the archaeological record has become largely an a
priori assumption and is believed by many to “mark” archaeological assemblages
indelibly. There are two major complications with this idea: first, many of the
causal hypotheses advanced to test the causal theory of ethnicity as a creative force
of distinctive archaeological patterning are fraught with internal contradictions and
faulty hypothesis construction; second, the concept of ethnicity itself is defined
poorly and is often non-reflexive. It is precisely the nature of ethnic identification
or, better yet, the lack of precision in the concept of ethnic identification, which
leads to indeterminate research designs, tautological arguments, anthropological
presentism, and historical misrepresentation.

Chapter III. Ethnicity a la Carte

Anthropologist Ernest Barth defined the concept of an ethnic group in 1963
by stating that,
A categorical ascription is an ethnic ascription when it classifies a person
in terms o f his basic, most general identity, presumptively determined by
his origin and background. To the extent that actors use ethnic identities to
categorize themselves and others fo r the purpose o f interaction, they form
ethnic groups in this organizational sense (Barth in McGuire 1982:160).
It is this definition of an “ethnic group” that implicitly informs much of the
theory and research on the subject in historical archaeology. With this definition,
historical archaeologists not only attempt to discern patterns of ethnic interaction
in the past, but also interact with the past on a personal level. This personal
interaction reveals itself in the form of late the 20th-century conflation of race,
economics and ethnicity and the unreflexive assumptions this conflation creates
which then are used to interpret the archaeological record.
At the root of this archaeologically expedient concept of ethnicity is the
cultural anthropological debate between ethnicity as a primordial categorization
versus an instrumental categorization. Primordialism suggests that ethnicity is an
27
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innate aspect of human identity, so intrinsic to the human cultural sphere that it
should require no explanation, only description, and serves the psychological
function of giving individuals a sense of identity as members of a discrete group
(Banks 1996:39). A.L Epstein is a strong proponent of this position in his work
Ethos and Identity (1978), in which he characterizes an “ethnic identity” as a
“terminal identity”, an identity
that embraces and integrates a whole series o f statuses, roles and lesser
identities (Epstein 1978:101).
Primordial ethnicity is, in large part, a response to the more pragmatic and
situationalized concept of instrumental ethnicity, a perspective advanced by Abner
Cohen in his work on the Ibadan Hausa of Yoruba, Custom and Politics in Urban
Africa: A Study o f Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns (1969). For Cohen, the
assertion and maintanance of ethnic identity is undertaken for economic and
political purposes and does not exist as an a priori set of values and customs.
Instrumental ethnicity is goal-oriented and “motivated. It comes into being for a
purpose and its continued existence is tied to that purpose”(Banks 1996: 39).
Historical archaeologists have latched onto the primordialist view of
ethnicity for obvious reasons. Primordialism implies a least common denominator
in the cultural analysis of different groups, a synchronic denominator which
archaeologists enumerate as a static laundry list of material culture. This
presumed stasis is a seductive analytical tool in that it reflects the inherently static
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nature of the archaeological record. Staticity, however, was never advocated by
the original proponents of the concept. Philosophically, primordialism suggests
only that individuals possess what Epstein referred to as “cognitive maps”
(Epstein 1978:11) which structure the inherent disposition of individuals to group
into ethnic categories as a means to develop a corporate identity. The exact
parameters of that identity are situational, bounded and defined by the corporate
identities of other groups, and while they may remain stable for certain times and
in certain places, it is those times and places which are instrumental in creating the
parameters and as such must be incorporated into any analysis of ethnicity.
One issue which, for many years, was not addressed directly in
anthropolgical research is the critical distinction between the analytical conceptual
tool of ethnicity as defined through primordial and instrumental explanations and
the observable reality of ethnic groups. This distinction is, in essence, the etic
versus emic tension that has cross-cut anthropological research for decades.
Anthropologists, as noted above, have long debated the genesis and nature
of ethnicity as a means to sharpen the concept as a research tool (Warner and
Lunt: 1942; Barth: 1969; Zenner: 1985; Yelvington: 1991) . More current
research, however, has begun to question the validity or usefulness of ethnicity as
an etic academic perspective in the analysis of cultures which develop their own
emic folk concepts of ethnic groups.
Karen Blu, in her research with the Lumbee Indians of Robeson County,
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North Carolina (1980), has commented that the notion of ethnicity serves as an
“external”, esoteric form of research which does little to illuminate the internal and
external dynamics of the people it attempts to categorize. Blu suggests that the
concept should be discarded in favor of the notion of ethnic identity, a native
category, one which is believed to be immutable and fixed by those who define
and group themselves under that rubric even if the academic definitions of
ethnicity could unmask it as a relatively recent invention or transformation (Blu
1980:220).
The Lumbee Indians present a compelling situation for the definition of
ethnicity or ethnic groups in that they are comprised of black, white and Native
American individuals seeking a basic group identity as Native Americans despite a
diverse and intermittently fractious background (Blu 1980:2). Blu does
acknowledge that in gaining Native American recognition the group would accrue
substantive political and legal benefits, an instrumentalist perspective on their selfidentification as a cohesive ethnic group. She goes on to say, however, that their
primary aim was to express their basic group identity as Native Americans for its
own sake, a primordialist approach to the concept of ethnic grouping.
While this approach may come closer to the reality of how people perceive
themselves through the lens of ethnicity, it is an approach which historical
archaeologists have not utilized. This may be because of the inherent limitations
of the data base with which archaeologists work, namely the frustratingly mute
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remains of long- dead individuals and communities who cannot be interviewed
directly for their perspective on the world. Blu discusses the problem in her own
work of interpreting the actions and motivations of deceased individuals in the
formation of ethnic identities and comments that all that exist are accounts of the
way they behaved (Blu 1908:184).
While this situation is analagous for those archaeologists fortunate enough
to stumble across salient documentary information in the course of their research,
more often than not in the investigation of the disenfranchised there is no such
information. When such information is uncovered, it is often in the form of
documents penned by the elite, an elite against which the ethnic group under
consideration has set its boundaries as a means to define itself. Delineation of
ethnic identity in this instance is a study in contradictions and presuppositions. A
hierarchy of increasingly abstract levels of understanding is set up when an
archaeologist a) Must assume an inherent understanding of the elite group which
has commented on the world around it and then b) construct an objectified,
academic identity of a group subordinate to the elite on the basis of that
commentary and then c) transform that objective identity, through another layer of
theory, into a subjective or folk “ethnic identity” and, finally d) extrapolate that
“ethnic identity” to the material remains of the group under study. Nowhere in
this intellectual endeavor is there a single living informant, only an observer (the
archaeologist) observing another observer (a long-dead elite) observing the
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observed (a long-dead “ethnic group”). This will remain a problem, until it is
more intensely scrutinized within the field, and will continue to plague efforts at
the reconstitution of ethnicity and ethnic groups from the past.
Dell Upton’s 1996 article, Ethnicity, Authenticity and Invented Traditions,
provides a particularly cogent discussion of the current use, or misuse, of
“ethnicity” as a tool for interpreting the archaeological record. His critique of the
epistemological assumptions which structure the issue not only point up theoretical
flaws in the ethnic “recovery of meaning” (Leone and Potter: 1988) from the
archaeological record, but flaws in the attendant social scientific methodology as
well.
Positivism is the dominant philosophy in ethnic interpretation, one that
posits a “catalog of values and practices uniquely associated with a particular
group of people as distinct from those practices and values of another” (Upton
1996:1).

As an example, one element in the unique catalog of values of African-

American ethnicity, as asserted by tour guides at the slave quarters at Carter’s
Grove Plantation in Virginia, is a cultural predisposition towards “thinking in the
round”. This predisposition, one is lead to infer, stands in stark contrast to the
more “rectilinear” thinking patterns of Anglo-Americans. Evidence to support this
assertion takes the form of the “kraals”, or semi-circular wattle fences which
surrounded the slave quarter reconstruction.
While an interesting argument, it is crippled on two levels. First, from a
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theoretical perspective, it betrays an a priori catalog of values and practices unique
to African-Americans, a rigid, etically-constructed catalog which speaks more to
an interpretive imperative among archaeologists looking at a vast array of disparate
material culture than to any demonstrable test of reality.
Second, this unique catalog of values and practices, which is a testable
hypothesis, is methodologically curtailed. The causal relationship between
African-Americaness and a particular pattern of material culture, in this case the
presence of kraals, is tested against nothing. The existence of semi-circular pens
on an African-American site is forwarded as evidence of a one-to-one correlation
between “thinking in the round” and African-American ethnicity. Unless this
theoretically unique value is tested methodologically against other data it remains
little more than a tautological argument. The argument that circular fences and
African-American ethnicity are uniquely linked remains convincing only so far as
no one points out other potential cases against which to test the assertion.
Comparable test cases can be found on the grounds at Carter’s Grove itself, such
as the archaeological evidence that Governor Harwood, the 17th-century
administrative head of the abortive settlement at Wolstenholme Towne, had a
semi-circular fence surrounding the front of his home at Site A, or that the
domestic unit of the town was surrounded by a roughly circular fence.
A prevailing belief in the stability and staticity o f ethnic culture, essentially
an unexamined, over-simplified primordialist position, is another hallmark of
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archaeological interpretation (Upton 1996:1). In this model, ethnicity is regarded
as a monolithic entity composed of that catalog of values and beliefs uniquely
associated with a specific group of people. The point at which this catalog of
behaviors, or traditions, froze in time and space and became the canonical text for
interpretation of a particular ethnic group is never stated explicitly - one can only
imagine a mythical time in the past in which all cultural standards were set and
social change effectively ceased (Posnansky 1989:1).
Theoretically, this notion is a-historical and presentist. To select, without
explicitly stated standards, a group of “traditional” behaviors to represent an entire
cultural unit through time deprives the individuals which make up the cultural unit
any degree of agency or control over the course of their own lives. The tacit
message is that but for contact with European culture, “ethnic” cultures would
have remained entrenched in “traditional” cultural patterns and lifestyles. The level
of a-historicity in the study of African-American ethnicity is further aggravated by
this notion of traditionally by a
naive assumption that there is a commonality o f African traditional culture
spread over a wide geographical area and over a long period o f time
(Posnansky 1989:1).
Methodologically, the correction to this bias lies in a more rigorous analysis
of African archaeology and history, to “search out every bit of information on the
origins of the ancestors of the Afro-Americans who occupied a particular site or
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area” (Posnansky 1989:5). This type of analysis will inevitably broaden and
deepen archaeological inquiry at African sites in the New World and counter
attempts to draw simplistic cultural parallels among the continents.
O f primary importance to historical archaeologists is the recovery and
identification of that material culture which represents ethnicity. Underlying this
goal is a sense that ethnicity is invested somehow in the material world and,
furthermore, that some artifacts are more “authentic” signs of ethnicity than others
(Upton 1996:1). This, too, leads to a host of theoretical and methodological
problems in the delineation of ethnicity in the archaeological record.
In discussing the role of material culture and African-American identity,
Upton has remarked that
The celebrated cowrie shells and blue beads excavated on slave sites speak
as eloquently about our desires as they do about African-American culture
(Upton 1996:3).
In the theory-driven search for the material culture correlates of ethnicity, it
has been the case that some signs, such as blue beads and cowrie shells, have been
judged more “authentic” than others. This judgement is not based on comparative
evaluations with other forms of material culture, but on pre-conceived, somewhat
romanticized, and largely ethnocentric ideas about what we believe constitutes the
ethnicity of the “other”.
The methodological danger in the use of blue beads or cowrie shells as
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ethnic “markers” is that it violates an important rule concerning causal theory
construction. The use of a “cowrie shell” as an “ethnic marker” is analogous to the
use of an “indicator” as an observable manifestation of an ambiguous “concept”.
As noted earlier, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this approach and, in
fact, it may be the only profitable way of dealing with the archaeological record.
Much of the literature on the identification of specific objects as “ethnic markers”,
however, uses those objects not merely as testable implications of a given
hypothesis but as concrete proof of a one-to-one correlation between a specific
manifestation of material culture and a specific ethnic group. In effect, the
material object is reified as the concept it is more properly meant to test, once
more a tautological situation which is both the product and perpetuator of an
overly simplistic and static view of culture process.
L. Daniel Mouer, in his article, Chesapeake Creoles: The Creation o f Folk
Culture in Colonial Virginia (1993), has characterized ethnicity as
a dynamic and polysemic set o f behaviors. Ethnic groupings are
situational, historical, culturally relative, fluid, negotiable, multi
dimensional, invented and re-invented every time they are used, discussed,
researched and thought (Mouer 1993:106).
The modifier of politically or nationally-constructed could also be added to
this characterization, a somewhat inflammatory notion but one that has serious
theoretical and methodological consequences for the historical and archaeological
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investigation of ethnicity.
In her 1992 article, O f Straightening Combs, Sodium Hydroxide and
Potassium Hydroxide in Archaeological and Cultural-Anthropological Analysis o f
Ethnogenesis, Brackette Williams tackles this notion of political power relations
and ideological agendas in the formation of ethnic groups, and how such
contemporary relationships color our vision of the past. Two of her major points
which have direct bearing on the study of ethnicity concern the analytic categories
of race and class.
Williams discusses the contradictions in the use of the term “ethnicity” and
states that ethnicity is
Not synonymous with the race concept, but it is a relative categorization
that cannot be understood apart from the concept o f race,
and is
Not analytically parallel to the concept o f class, but as a categorical
distinction employed in nation-states, it cannot be understood apart from
the idea o f class as a culture-bearing unit (Williams 1992:609).
The definitions of race and class further complicate the matter. The notion
of race is defined in evolutionary biology as a “geographically separated, hence
genetically somewhat distinctive, population within a species ” (OED 1989:69).
Class is outlined lengthily as “large categories ofpopulation, distinct from other
categories in respect o f wealth and related social position, deriving their
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distinctive status mainly from their location in the production and distribution o f
social wealth, sharing accordingly in distinctive interests either opposing or
complementing other group interests, and consequently displaying a tendency to a
group - distinctive political, cultural, and social attitudes and behaviors (Kruper
1996:90). While it is evident that these two terms are not strictly interchangeable
with the term ethnicity, they are implicitly subsumed by the term in an attempt to
maximize leverage and decrease the number of explanatory variables in the
problem. In collapsing these individually abstract terms into the cumulatively
more abstract rubric of ethnicity, one-to-one correlations between material culture
and ethnicity are confounded through the error of omitted variable bias.
For the purposes of designing useful theories and hypotheses about
“ethnicity” in the past, the term itself must be deconstructed into its currently
formulated constituent parts. The examination of African-American ethnicity from
an archaeological standpoint, for example, must include economic status as a
discrete explanatory variable to demonstrate whether it does or does not co-vary
with African geographical heritage. If all African-American sites examined coj

vary with a low socio-economic status, than the variable of African-American
“ethnicity” as the causal factor for an observed material culture pattern cannot be
separated analytically from the economic explanatory variable, resulting in an
indeterminate research design.
Similarly, if ethnicity is always couched in terms of racial background and
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all “ethnic” sites are defined presumptively by the racial background of their past
inhabitants than, once more, ethnicity and race co-vary and are not meaningfully
separable. This situation is even more contentious than the co-variation of
economics with ethnicity in that the concept of “race” is ill-defined, controversial
and, despite some ill-starred and racist attempts (i.e. The Bell Curve, Hermstein
and Murray 1994), does not lend itself well to quantitative analysis.
In separating out the social variables that serve as the current scaffolding
for the construct of “ethnicity”, ethnicity itself must be re-evaluated based on a
new set of criteria. This criteria, ideally, should take the form of more
geographically and historically specific analyses of cultural interaction and should
better serve to pinpoint those pieces and patterns of material culture which bear
potential ethnic significance.

Chapter IV. Patterns Progress: Ethnicity, Patterns, Process and
Problems

Archaeology in the humanities is concerned with human sensuality,
sociability, wisdom, ideational internalization, cultivation o f the intellect
and education toward the enjoyment o f life (South 1977:5).
So wrote Stanley South, not without some admiration, of the humanistic
goals encompassed by the discipline of archaeology. Citing Noel Hume and
Ascher and Fairbanks, South described an academic environment in which “a
personal confrontation with the past” (Noel Hume in South 1977: 7) seemed to be
the primary aim, an artistically-rendered and, ultimately, subjective interpretation
of the archaeological record.
It is exactly this subjective and “unscientific” approach to the past to which
South theoretically and methodologically objects and out of this objection he
produced his seminal 1977 monograph, Method and Theory in Historical
Archaeology. In it, South makes the point that in order for historical archaeology
to transcend the academic harangue of antiquarianism it must transcend the pursuit
of particularistic studies toward the creation of more generalizing scientific
theories concerning human behavior as reflected in the archaeological record. He
40
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rightly asserts, contrary to Noel Hume’s perspective, that “science” is not merely a
technical aid to archaeologists possessed by “outside” experts, but rather a way of
organizing and examining data for more efficient problem solving (South 1977:8).
South suggests the use of pattern analysis as a means to construct lawlike
generalizations about the past. The lawlike generalizations to which South aspires
are meant to elucidate regularities in culture processes, processes which he
believes leave identifiable patterns in archaeological assemblages. He remarks that
Historical archaeologists have concentrated on the reconstruction o f
culture history and the reconstruction o f lifeways and have virtually
ignored delineation o f culture process. The key to understanding culture
process lies in pattern recognition...Once pattern is recognized\ the
archaeologist can then ask why the pattern exists, why it is often so
predictive it can be expressed by laws (South 1988:31).
He does caution, however, that
Confirmed general laws do not ‘p rovide us with an understanding o f
history ’... understanding comes only when we ask why the facts are the way
they are. This is theory building (South 1977:16).
Through his examination of specific discard patterns and ratios of artifact
classes to one another, South developed the general analytical tool of pattern
analysis to quantify such specific assemblages as the Carolina, Kitchen, Frontier
and Inventory patterns. Through the demarcation of these assemblages he hoped
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to shed light not only on the site-specific processes that created them, but also on
the larger historical and cultural processes which served as the foundation from
which the patterns derived their predictive strength.
Historical archaeologists have employed South’s tool of pattern recognition
widely since its introduction; unfortunately, much of its use has been of an
uncritical and misguided nature. Charles Orser has been particularly sharp in his
criticism of pattern analysis, particularly in regards to the implementation of the
“Plantation Pattern” by other archaeologists, and more generally of South’s
“eclectic” approach to anthropological theory (Orser 1989:23).
The root of the problem lies in a fundamental incommensurability between
the theory of pattern recognition and its practical usage in archaeological
interpretation. This incommensurability has led to the creation of one-to-one
correlations between specific archaeological patterns and specific cultural patterns,
essentially an assemblage-based analog to the use of individual pieces of material
culture as “markers” for distinct ethnic groups. These correlations are often
gleaned from highly circumscribed data sets and then declared general laws, often
to the exclusion of further hypothetico-deductive testing. From the outlook of
social scientific theory construction, this approach is akin to putting the theoretical
cart before the methodological horse.
Many archaeologists have misapplied the notion of pattern analysis to
represent not culture process but culture itself. As such, the two terms warrant
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specific definitions. The archaeologist Brain Fagan, borrowing from the Victorian
anthropologist Sir Edward Tylor, defines culture as
the complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law,
custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man (or woman)
as a member o f society (Fagan 1997:36).
He further defines culture process as
the attempt to consider all o f the factors that cause changes in human
culture and how they affect one another (Fagan 1997:36).
An expansion of this notion of culture process would include consideration
of not only those factors which cause change, but also those factors which
maintain cultural stasis. While cultural change is explicitly dynamic in nature, the
process by which cultural traits are retained over time may be considered an
equally dynamic, if less visible, form of culture process. The active conservation
of long-standing cultural traits against larger currents of cultural transformation
can require as much energy as that possessed by the transformative processes
themselves.
The interpretation of an archaeological pattern as the symbolic maintenance
of a particular cultural identity moves away from the explanation of culture
process through which the pattern was produced and serves as a metaphor for
culture itself. A good example of this tendency is the use of the pattern of a
predominance of hollow forms versus flat forms in an archaeological assemblage
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as a “marker” for African-American ethnicity. The evidence to support this
assertion relies on the idea that African-Americans retained traditional culinary
practices when brought to the New World, and is a well-founded assertion based
on evidence of the conservatism of foodways among all cultures (Goody 1982;
Brown and Mussell 1984).
However, this interpretation of the archaeological pattern does not address
the dynamic process of African adaptation to New World conditions as evidenced
in foodways, but mistakenly reifies a single aspect of “African” culture lifted
wholesale from the shores of the African continent. One facet of African culture,
namely foodways, is forwarded as the archaeological representation o f AfricanAmerican culture. This reduces a complicated cultural identification to a collection
of bowls and plates and, conversely, reifies the bowls and plates as AfricanAmerican culture itself.
This contradiction is largely the product of the interchangeable analytical
use of the concepts of “culture” and “ethnicity”. “Culture” represents a monolithic
entity, a product of any number of complex processes which, if frozen in time,
would represent a cohesive, if artificial, whole. Pattern analysis stumbles when it
mistakes whole cultural entities with culture process (Orser 1989:29), thereby
reifying the indicator as the concept.
The meaning of an identified archaeological pattern is confused by the
implicit interchangability of the terms “culture” and “ethnicity”. African-
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American identity in the New World is a product of two distinct but enmeshed
cultures, namely Western European (specifically English) and African. As
mentioned earlier, the specific nature of African culture is circumscribed
geographically and, at this point, poorly understood. Nevertheless, for the sake of
interpretive purposes, archaeologists have itemized African culture, rightly or
wrongly, into a series of concrete attributes or indicators. The patterned presence
of these indicators in an archaeological assemblage which then is touted as
evidence of African-American ethnicity.
What is actually in evidence, however, is a static whole cultural pattern
from Africa which says nothing about the process of ethnic identification among
Africans in North America. The contact of African and English “cultures”
precipitated a dynamic “process” of ethnogenesis or, perhaps, subcultural
identification, among Africans and, to a lesser extent, among the English. The
methodological and theoretical error is compounded in two ways: first, pattern
analysis is used incorrectly to represent holistic cultural traditions when it should
in fact elucidate cultural process and; second, ethnicity is represented
archaeologically as a single, static cultural pattern rather than as a dynamic
exchange between cultures. In short, ethnicity becomes a synonym for a
monolithic cultural tradition and becomes a monolithic concept in and of itself.
Whether these errors in identification take the form of material culture patterns or
singular items of material culture, the true dynamic nature of ethnic identification
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is lost. Brackette Williams describes this paradox in her discussion of ethnic
identification among the Genizaro, a New Mexican Native American group, when
she states
In search o f the material culture o f the Genizaro, Cordell and Yannie
ignore their status as a product o f power relations. This inattention results,
first, in the elimination o f the diverse factors ofproduction. Second, it
leads to a failure to direct attention to the material productions o f these
power relations (i.e. the Genizaro), which cannot be an authentic denial
(i.e. a surviving Indian element), o f the very cultural processes that
produced the Genizaro as a categorical identity because these artifacts do
not distinguish one ethnic group from another. Thus it is unclear how such
a processual account is to advance our understanding o f ethnogenesis
when, in the end, it seems to depend on the methodological denial o f the
very process out o f which the ethnic group was produced... Finding the
surviving remains o f one aspect o f their identity - the Indian- is not to
reconstruct them as an ethnic group, but rather to return to the point o f
contact and, at best, indicate was contact was not able to obliterate
(Williams 1992:611).
A second, more general criticism of pattern analysis is best described
through Clifford Geertz’s “twitch and wink” argument. King et.al. employ this
metaphor to discuss the imputation of meaning into the construction of causal

relationships, and it is equally appropriate to a discussion of pattern analysis.
Geertz writes
Consider... two boys rapidly contracting the eyelids o f their right eyes. In
one, this is an involuntary twitch; in the other, a conspiratorial signal to a
friend. The two movements are, as movements, identical; from an I-am-acamera, <
(p henomenalistic ” observation o f them alone, one could not tell
which was a twitch and which was a wink, or indeed whether both or either
was twitch or wink. Yet the difference, however unphotographable,
between a twitch and a wink is vast; as anyone unfortunate enough to have
had the first taken fo r the second knows. The winker is communicating, and
indeed communicating in a precise and special way: (1) deliberately, (2) to
someone in particular, (3) to impart a particular message, (4) according to
a socially established code, and (5) without cognizance o f the rest o f the
company. As Ryle points out, the winker has done two things, contracted
his eyelids and winked, while the twitcher has done only one, contracted his
eyelids. Contracting your eyelids on purpose when their exists a public
code in which doing so counts as a conspiratorial signal is winking (Geertz
1973:6).
What this analogy suggests for pattern analysis is that any observed pattern,
in this case a preponderance of hollow forms over flat forms, and the interpretation
of that pattern, namely, the maintenance of traditional African foodways, can and
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should be arrived at only as a consequence of a detailed understanding of the
cultural milieu in which the pattern was produced. Unfortunately, the African and
African-American milieu is one with which, as Posnansky has noted, we are
hardly familiar. In short, cultural process in Africa first must be better understood
before its dynamic interaction with the cultural processes of the English, and the
ethnically meaningful products and patterns of that interaction, can be identified.
There is also a danger when looking for ethnic “markers” in the form of
archaeological patterns that those patterns may come to embody those markers by
default through researcher-induced bias or “distortions of survival” (Prown
1982:20). While some patterns may bear closer scrutiny as potential ethnic
markers, researchers must keep in mind that they simply may represent part of the
range of variation inherent in the formation and utilization of material culture. The
question becomes - did a higher percentage of bowls over plates have ethnic or
cultural meanings for the individuals using them or is it merely a convenient
archaeological pattern to which we must accord significance because bowls and
plates are all we have?
The bias of the archaeological record, a world-induced bias (King et al.
1994:135-136) of differential preservation and excavation opportunities, is one
over which archaeologists often have little control. On the other hand, the
collection, or lack of collection, of pertinent historical and cultural data is an
investigator-induced bias (King et al. 1994:132-134) and one which can have the
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most impact on a more comprehensive understanding of particular patterns in the
ground. Until archaeologists more completely immerse themselves in the details
of African and African-American culture process on a specific level, than the
patterns which we now interpret as ethnic “winks” cannot be separated analytically
from the material culture “twitches” of random variation, bias, or mere chance.

Chapter V. African-Am erican Ethnicity: The M ethodology o f Essentialism
Versus Context

Over the past twenty-five years, African-American archaeology has become
one of the most highly visible and intellectually productive avenues of
archaeological inquiry. Much of this inquiry has settled on the material culture
associated with plantation contexts in the South and aggregates of African and
African-American populations. Most notable among the publications on the
subject is John Solomon Otto’s dissertation-based monograph, Cannon ’s Point
Plantation, 1794-1860: Living Conditions and Status Patterns in the Old South
(1984), a comparative archaeological study of the material culture of the three
social classes of planter, overseer and slave in antebellum Georgia.
In his quantification of the ceramic tablewares among the three sites
examined at Cannon’s Point, Otto calculated the proportion of serving bowls, or
hollow forms, to be roughly 45% in the slave assemblage, 25% in the overseer
assemblage, and 10% in the planter assemblage. Conversely, serving tablewares,
such as plates and soup plates, or flat forms, comprised roughly 50% of the slave
assemblage, 70% of the overseer assemblage and 85% of the planter assemblage.
Briefly, Otto suggests that this variation is the consequence of differential status
50
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based on differential access to economic resources which in turn dictated the
quality and forms of ceramics used by the three groups. As a tool for further
research, Otto is very explicit in defining the analytical parameters of his research
design and interpretive goals. He states as his primary hypothesis that
A t Old South tidewater plantations known to have been occupied by white
planters, white overseers, and black slaves, one may expect to fin d statusrelated patterning in the archaeological and written records o f material
living conditions... because o f differing access to the plantation surplus
(Otto 1984:171).
As a subhypothesis he states that
In terms o f household and personal possessions, such data categories as
ceramic types should reveal patterning that reflects economic status
differences; ceramic shapes and form s should reveal patterning that
reflects social status differences... (Otto 1984:171).
While inductively reached, Otto has proposed a clear research design for
the construction of a causal theory - the effect of status on archaeological
assemblages - and then defines the theoretically observable implications of that
theory, among them a preponderance of hollow forms within slave assemblages as
a reflection of limited economic means. In addition, he effectively maximizes the
leverage of his theory by circumscribing it temporally and geographically to the
antebellum South and by addressing the relationship among three historically and
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contextually-defined economic classes.
Not long after the publication of Otto’s research, another African-American
site, this time in New England, was revisited by Vernon Baker. Originally
excavated by Adelaide and Ripley Bullen in 1945, Black Lucy’s Garden in
i

Andover, Massachusetts dates from approximately 1812-1845 and represents one
of the first sites extensively reported upon with an eye to the reconstruction of an
African-American life.
The story o f this site is really the biography o f Lucy Foster, a negress. As it
sheds some light on the Andover o f 100 to 200 years ago, as well as giving
the very human story o f Lucy, it seems worthwhile to briefly include it here.
The history o f the specimens dug up cannot be properly separated from the
history o f those who used them. (Bullen and Bullen 1945:26).
It is unclear whether Lucy Foster was African- or American-born as the
documentary record concerning her life is extremely sparse. What is known is that
she was in all likelihood a slave within the well-to-do household of the yeoman
Job Foster by 1771. During her tenure at the Foster’s, she gave birth to a
daughter, performed any number of domestic duties common among New England
servants, and eventually gained her freedom around 1780. After Job Foster’s
death in 1782, Lucy remained with his widow, Hannah. Over the course of the
next 30 years, Lucy moved from the Foster homestead, to the homestead of
Hannah’s new husband, Philemon Chandler, and back to the Foster tract, gave
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birth to a son in 1792, and was admitted to the South Parish Church in 1793 on
profession of faith.
Upon Hannah Foster’s death in 1812, Lucy was willed a one acre plot
within the bounds of the remaining Foster property on which she built a small
cabin and lived until her death in 1845. Lucy’s means of support during the 30
years she lived on her own property is unclear, but her enrollment on the Andover
parish dole immediately after Hannah’s death suggests it was probably a meager
existence. In excavating Lucy’s acre, including a cellar hole, a dump, and a well,
the Bullens were able to reconstruct a picture of an elderly black woman who
managed, possibly with the help of her son, to support herself for 30 years through
supportive ties with the church and the surrounding Anglo-American community.
They comment that
She seems to be a worthy, respected and faithful person with a flair fo r
collecting pottery (Bullen and Bullen 1945:28).
It was just this flair for collecting pottery that Vernon Baker focused on in
his 1978 re-examination of Black Lucy’s Garden. In quantifying the ceramic
sherds from the site and establishing minimum vessel counts, Baker arrived at a
proportion of flat forms versus hollow forms that bore a striking resemblance to
that which Otto calculated for the slave sites at Cannon’s Point. Out of 113
mended vessels encompassing 49 tableware items, roughly 40% of the tableware
represented serving bowls, or hollow forms, a proportion in agreement with that
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arrived at by Otto. Additionally, the presence of chopped cuts of meats, suitable
for pottages and stews, constituted the majority of the identifiable
zooarchaeological remains. This, too, coincided with Otto’s findings at the slave
sites in Georgia.
From this comparative data, Baker chose a different interpretive path than
that of Otto. He suggested that this specific pattern of ceramic vessels and faunal
remains indicated not merely economic or status issues, but a pattern distinctive of
African-American occupation and the retention of “Africanisms” among
transplanted populations.
Although affiliation o f the above patterns to African cultural elements is
unclear, the presence o f serving bowls exceeding 40% o f all tableware, plus
choppedfaunal remains approaching 100% o f all such remains, appear
distinctive o f Afro-American sites, both slave and free (Baker 1978:112).
While circumspect in the exact relationship between these Africanisms and the
unique African-American archaeological patterns they seemed to produce, Baker
cited the work of Blassingame, Garret and Lomax as references for the nature and
quality of African survivals, including such archaeologically invisible
characteristics as music, food and dance (Baker 1978:110). As Baker formulated
his argument, the patterned “Africanism” of a given percentage of hollow forms
in a ceramic assemblage came to represent an approach to cooking and eating
“Among traditional West African peoples, (where) it was common practice to stew
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grains, vegetables, and meats with pepper in ceramic vessels (Otto 1984:174).
Both Baker and Otto present interesting arguments for the presence of
particular patterns among different assemblages, but it has been Baker’s study
which has received the most currency among historical archaeologists. This is no
doubt because Baker’s interpretation of Black Lucy’s Garden speaks directly to
issues of ethnicity and ethnogenesis; indeed, Black Lucy’s Garden is cited
extensively in current research on the topic of African American archaeology and
remains required reading in many undergraduate and graduate archaeology classes.
Baker’s monograph, unfortunately, is highly flawed from a social scientific,
causal theory construction standpoint. The range of issues discussed in Chapters
II, III, and IV converge in Baker’s interpretation of Black Lucy’s Garden and,
more troubling, in the continuing advocacy and reconstitution of his perspective.

I f pattern recognition does not go beyond identifying and labeling pattern,
it is a particularistic and inductivist exercise o f dubious value in itself
(South 1988:27).
Acute interest in the subject of African-American ethnicity has lead to
many detailed, “post-processual” discussions of power relations, selfidentification, and boundary maintenance (Wade 1988; Williams 1992; Fitts 1996;
Upton 1996). This post-processual dialogue has been translated into
archaeological and “processual” terms through the use pattern analysis.
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Specifically, some historical archaeologists have claimed that “unique” material
culture assemblages constitute one-to-one correlations with African-American
occupied sites. Pattern analysis has been a powerful analytical tool in this
enterprise, but also has been weakened though theoretical and methodological
misapplication.
The basic theory within African-American archaeological research is
understood most clearly in diagrammatic form as derived from the discussion in
Chapter II:
General Causal Theory M odel

Explanatory V ariable
/
Key Causal Variable

Dependent / Outcome Variable
(observable implication)

\
Control Variable

“Ethnicity” Causal Theory H ypothesis

Ethnicity (Key Causal Variable)

Specific Archaeological Patterning
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African-Am erican Ethnicity Causal Theory Subhypothesis

African-American Ethnicity (Key Causal Variable)

Predominance of Hollow
Forms

/

\

Enslaved

Free (Control Variables)

North

South

At the most general level of criticism, the association of a preponderance of
hollow forms as indicative of, or caused by, African-American ethnic practices
remains largely a tautological argument. The range of excavated sites hold the
key causal variable, African-American ethnicity, constant as the sites were, by
definition, occupied by African-Americans. This represents an example of
selection bias as “the causal effect of an explanatory variable that does not vary
cannot be assessed” (King et al. 1994:146). It is a circular argument to assert that
a 40% proportion of hollow forms in a ceramic assemblage is representative of
African-American ethnicity when the only sites against which the hypothesis is
tested are known African-American occupied sites.
Both Baker and Otto recognize this circularity, at least implicitly, (Baker
1978:113; Otto 1984:175) and recommend testing the hypothesis against poor
white sites, both North and South. It seems from a survey of the literature,
however, that the hypothetical correlation of a specific ceramic pattern with
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African-American ethnicity has become a canonical truth for many archaeologists.
This perception has effectively stifled attempts at falsification of the hypothesis
and has led to profound investigator-induced bias in the data collected to test the
hypothesis.
Theresa Singleton has noted that the increased excavation of sites of
antebellum free blacks and emancipated men and women in the South will provide
a more “rounded” data base against which hypotheses about African-American
ethnicity, including ceramic patterns, may be tested (Singleton in Orser 1989:158159). Robert Fitts, in his 1996 article, Landscapes o f Northern Bondage, remarks
that without the excavation of more Northern slave quarters, the extent of the
similarities between Northern and Southern patterns of resistance will remain
unclear. While both authors provide excellent suggestions for the elaboration and
further testing of a pre-existing theory, neither allows for variation on the key
causal variable, African-American site occupation. It would be more
methodologically fruitful to test these hypotheses against data sets in which the
key causal variable provided some range of variation.
One possibility lies in the excavation and analysis of poor white sites, both
North and South, of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This social class
represents probably the only group which is more archaeologically and historically
understudied than that of African-Americans. The study of the material culture of
enslaved African-Americans has benefited, ironically, from the concentration of

59

that population in rural plantation contexts, contexts which often are well
documented even if those documents do not deal specifically with the African
inhabitants of the area. Douglas Armstrong, Leland Ferguson, and Jim Deetz,
among many others, have utilized this concentration of information to study
African-American lifeways in a community environment.
Poor whites do not often present “convenient” rural aggregations amenable
to archaeological study. Such individuals more often than not lived in expedient
and highly perishable housing, eked out meager existences from marginal land
with little in the way of material comforts, and died, unnoticed and unaccounted.
This situation makes it extraordinarily difficult to find these individuals in history
or in the ground.
One potentially productive avenue for the investigation of poor whites is in
the excavation and analysis of those sites where rural Anglo-Americans did
congregate and live in acute poverty, namely almshouses or asylums. The recent
completion of the Phase II site examination of the 19th-century Smithfield Town
Farm and Asylum, excavated by the Public Archaeology Laboratory, Inc. in
Smithfield, Rhode Island (CNEA Newsletter 1997:14), presents an interesting case
against which to test the notion of the specific archaeological patterning of ceramic
wares as indicative of a particular ethnic group. Like the slaves at Cannon’s Point,
the residents at the Asylum relied heavily on donated ceramic wares, usually older
and in less than pristine condition. The comparison of the assemblage at the Poor
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Farm in Smithfield with plantation slave quarters may provide interesting insights
into dining habits and preferences and the purported effect of ethnicity on those
preferences.
Another comparative choice is that of Native American sites. Excavations
at the Mashantucket Pequot Reservation in Ledyard, Connecticut have unearthed
both isolated native farmsteads and a small, rural Pequot community dating to the
late-18th to early-19th centuries. Both data sets comprise sizable ceramic
assemblages and some primary historical documentation. Like enslaved Africans
brought to the New World, Native Americans also experienced massive “culture
shock” upon contact with Europeans which precipitated both adaptation and
resistance. The comparison of the archaeological assemblages of this group with
those of plantation slaves will allow for a more critical evaluation of the degree to
which “ethnicity” is materially patterned.
A final comparative possibility is that of communities or homesteads where
both Native Americans and African-Americans lived together. Intermarriage
between African-Americans and Native Americans was extremely common in the
18th and 19th centuries, in part the result of a shared marginalized existence and a
common antipathy towards the larger white community. Once such site, the
Robert Croud homestead in Sturbridge, Massachusetts, was home to Robert
Croud, a Punkapoag Indian, and his African-American wife, Diantha Scott, during
the 1840s. In reconstructing the family genealogy, researchers at Old Sturbridge
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Village in Sturbridge, Massachusetts, discovered that Diantha’s parents, Guy and
Hannah Scott, were also of African and Native origin and relatively prosperous
until bad health and accumulated debts forced the sale of the family farmstead and
adjoining lands. Robert Croud himself did relatively well financially early in his
life, although his financial situation at the time of his death in 1889 is currently
unknown (Baron, et al. 1996).
Delineating material markers of “ethnicity” in this situation would be
complex, to say the least. In this case, not only are there two “ethnic variables” to
evaluate but also how those ethnic variables interacted with one another and the
external Anglo-American community. This type of data base alone confounds
questions concerning the material expression of ethnicity. Are we to afford
primacy to the Indian or African element in material culture production? Will one
necessarily swamp out the other? If so, why? Despite, or maybe because of, all of
these uncertainties, sites such as the Robert Croud house can provide yet another
explanatory variable for assessing the utility of ethnicity as a causal factor in
pattern analysis.
The degree to which Baker’s theory has been uncritically accepted by many
historical archaeologists is illustrated in biased data collection and analysis and in
contradictory statements such as “A few preliminary studies have
found...distinctive African-American...dining patterns” (Fitts 1996:169). Only
through efforts at falsifying the theory, efforts best directed at the construction of
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alternative hypotheses such as those suggested, can the general veracity and
analytical parameters of the theory be assessed (King et al. 1994:19).
It is an historian, Herbert Gutman, who confronts this point most concretely
in his comprehensive study of African-American life, The Black Family in Slavery
and Freedom, 1750-1925. In it he argues that
Methods are used and questions are asked that take account o f the many
unique circumstances associated with enslavement but nevertheless remain
appropriate to the study o f the development o f all exploited and dependent
social classes, slave and free, white and non-white... a point emphasized
not to argue that slaves and free workers had a similar history but rather to
suggest that the same questions can and must be asked o f such classes to
understand important similarities and differences between them (Gutman
1976:3).
A far more abstract problem in both Baker’s and Otto’s work, a problem
extensively addressed in Chapter III, is the essentialist and static definition of
ethnicity which the authors imply in their one-one-correlation between AfricanAmerican ethnicity and patterned ceramic assemblages. This implied definition is
shared by many historical archaeologists who view “Africaness...(as)...an ineffable
and inexplicable quality...” (Upton 1996:3), but a quality that paradoxically
unmasks itself in the form of distinctive architectural patterns (Vlach 1976:47-70),
ceramic assemblages, and faunal remains. In using “African-American ethnicity”
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as a key causal variable in their hypotheses concerning assemblage formation and
patterning, Otto and Baker adopt a theoretically reductionist and methodologically
meaningless stance.
From a theoretical standpoint, they assume a homogeneity of adaptive
strategies among African populations in North America independent of individual
desires and historical contexts. Collective behavioral interpretations as embodied
in pattern analysis at Cannon’s Point are extrapolated implicitly as representations
of individual behavior at Black Lucy’s Garden. In doing so, Lucy’s individuality
and specific historical condition are subsumed within the artificial construct of
African-American ethnicity (Upton 1996:5-6). Gutman comments on this
erroneous assumption by noting
How slaves learned and what they learned from always affected what they
believed and therefore how they behaved and the choices they made
(Gutman 1976:31).
The choices made by African-Americans were shaped both by internal and
external forces, either in isolation, as in the case of Lucy Foster living in
predominantly white, antebellum New England, or in community as among the
large slave population at Cannon’s Point plantation. On the nature of internal
community choice and change Gutman notes
Slave-naming practices and marital rules... are unmistakable evidence o f
the importance o f interior slave beliefs and experiences in shaping their
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behavior. But these beliefs and the developing culture that sustained them
could not have regularly revealed themselves over time i f they were no
more than free-floating slave beliefs... Institutional arrangements especially among slaves- had to exist fo r such beliefs to be acted on over
time, and that is why inter- and intragene rational linkages between slave
families are so important (Gutman 1976:259-260, emphasis added).
External dynamics Were unquestionably powerful in shaping AfricanAmerican identity, slave and free, as well.
What an African learned about slavery and about New World culture
differed greatly i f the African had prolonged contact with a wealthy
Carolina plantation fam ily like the Beverlys, a small planter, a sailor, or a
horse trader (Gutman 1976:339).
In other words, African-American beliefs, reactions and attitudes were
shaped as much by the diversity of white cultural environments to which they were
exposed as by internal African cultural beliefs and customs.
The essential point is that the adaptive capacities of African-Americans,
enslaved or free, isolated or aggregated, are the product of the cumulative
experience of past generations in Africa and the New World (Gutman 1976:34)
and a diversity of white environments, not merely a formulaic, monolithic suite of
behaviors lifted directly from the shores of West Africa. It was the long-term
dynamics of these variables which shaped individual and group behavior which, in
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turn, shaped the resultant material culture.
This assertion requires that the term ethnicity be “unpacked” of its
constituent theoretical and historically specific baggage in order to construct
analytically useful causal theory. Gutman astutely observes that
Inadequate study o f how there developed among Afro-American slaves what
Mintz calls “historically derived values, behavior patterns and practices ”
obscures and even distorts the meaning o f accurately observed slave
behavior (Gutman 1976:32).
In trying to make sense of the material culture ostensibly representative of
African-American ethnicity, we must separate the value culture of AfricanAmericans, the customs, beliefs and values presumably influenced by an African
heritage, from the reality culture or aspects of slave life largely influenced by
external forces (Singleton in Orser 1989:142). In separating these spheres
methodologically we then can examine how they intersected one another and how
that intersection manifested itself materially.
As discussed in Chapter III, the concept of “ethnicity” is rather an
amorphous explanatory variable, lacking the degree of concreteness that would
allow for its use as a strong key causal variable. The issue becomes even more
complex when “African-American ethnicity”, specifically, is used as the key
causal variable in the formation of archaeological patterns. In effect, the
“ineffable quality” of “African-Americaness” is used as a singular and constant
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causal variable, one in which potentially important control variables are ignored.
The underlying theoretical message is that merely sharing in a common African
heritage is enough to validate “African-American ethnicity” as an adequate cause
for observable archaeological patterns. While intuitively persuasive for many, this
approach founders on the methodological flaw of omitted variable bias, a bias
caused by the collinearity of explanatory variables, and is best observed in the
examination of Baker’s investigation of Black Lucy’s Garden.
In hypothesizing the causal effect of the variable of African-American
ethnicity, Baker’s casual theory structure takes the form of that diagramed in the
African-American Ethnicity Causal Theory Subhypothesis. This model uses an illdefined concept, ethnicity, as the key causal variable in the formation of the
concept’s indicator, a predominance of hollow forms in a ceramic assemblage.
Baker’s hypothetical control variables are actually of very little substantive effect
in that they do not critically deconstruct the monolith of “African-American
ethnicity” but provide artificial controls on a tautological theory.
In an effort to increase the concreteness of the explanatory variable in order
to more accurately assess its predictive power, it is more useful to refer to
William’s discussion of the factors which are subsumed implicitly within the
construct of “ethnicity”, namely the variables of race and class. In doing so, the
diagram takes on the following shape:
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African-American Ethnicity ------ Preponderanceof Hollow Forms
/
Race

\
Class

It then is useful to further subdivide the categories of race and class into their
specific values as represented in Baker’s study of Black Lucy and, incidentally, as
they conform to the situation of the plantation slaves in Otto’s work.
African-American Ethnicity —
/
Race
/
Black

Preponderance of Hollow Forms

\
Class
\
Lower socio-economic bracket

While the use of the term “black” may produce a sour taste in many
people’s mouths, for the purposes of this model it is necessary for semantic
reasons. The substitution of the term “black” with “African” or “of African
heritage”, while politically preferable, is methodologically untenable. Both
“African” and “of African heritage” imply a whole suite of cultural and historical
particularities and, therefore, cannot be used effectively to deconstruct the concept
of ethnicity as they represent complicated ideas in their own rights. In this
instance, “black” is meant to represent only the methodologically defining attribute
of the color of an individual’s skin as distinct from the skin color of a larger
“white” population.
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The next step is to assess the relationship of the constituent variables of
ethnicity as they have been methodologically unpacked. This assessment relies
heavily on specific historical factors and, critically, on the determination of the
independence of the component explanatory variables of African-American
ethnicity, the requirement that the variables of race and class do not co-vary with
one another.
In the case of Lucy Foster, a 19th-century African-American woman in
New England, the factors of race and class may co-vary strongly. In discussing the
importation of black slaves into the 18th-century Boston market, Beth Anne Bower
noted
White servants did not constitute a suitable source o f labor...Not only did
white servants tend to run away, but B oston’s elite dreaded the possibility
that the servants, once free, would strive and possibly succeed in raising
themselves to their masters ’ social level. There was no threat o f social
equality in the case o f black slaves, fo r even free black men were doomed to
the bottom o f the white social strata by the color o f the their skin (Bower
1991:59).
Undoubtedly, this “dogged racism” (Bower 1991:61), based on skin color
and enforced by the intentional limitation of economic opportunity, applied to both
male and female African-Americans and carried over into the next century.
The generally peripheral importance of free African-Americans to the larger
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Northern economy also contributed to their economic limitations (Piersen 1988:3).
19th-century New England maintained an industrial economy flooded with cheap
skilled and semi-skilled immigrant labor, immigrant labor which, more
significantly, had white skin (Horton 1979:9). The Hortons have calculated in
their book, Black Bostonians, that on the eve of the Civil War, blacks in Boston
had a per capita property worth of $91 in comparison to the per capita worth of
$872 for the entire population of Boston. Even the Irish, scorned and marginalized
immigrants to the city, were economically better off than the blacks with a per
capita wealth of $131 in 1860 (Horton 1979:12).
How closely the black experience in urban Boston reflected the conditions of
African-Americans in more rural settings, such as Lucy’s residence in Andover, is
unclear. There are a number of clues, however, which suggest that the economic
situation for blacks was not improved appreciably by life in the New England
countryside. Karen Hansen, in her study of social interactions in non-urban New
England contexts, A Very Social Time: Crafting Community in Antebellum New
England (1994), has written that white rural and working class New Englanders
expressed a social racism to maintain white privilege and exclude free blacks from
getting an education, learning a trade, or even traveling as free persons (Hansen
1994:168). This “social racism” generated dire economic consequences for
blacks, particularly when manifested as an active opposition to acquiring labor
skills.
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Obviously, procedural freedom for African-Americans in New England did
not equal substantive equality, either socially or economically. In fact, the process
of emancipation often led to profound economic misery. Piersen notes that in the
year 1742 in Boston, over 7% of the black population was free but living in
almshouses. This situation was particularly common among elderly black men,
both in rural and urban settings. These individuals, when freed in their old age,
were far more liable to live alone and suffer from improper care than either elderly
white men and women or elderly black women (Piersen 1988:22). That
emancipation and freed status was an economically tenuous situation for most
blacks was acknowledged tacitly in colonial New England by a law which
legislated “against their manumission unless their masters gave bond for fear they
became public charge” (Greene in Cromwell 1994:27 ). That this condition
persisted into the 1800s is testified to by the life of Lucy Foster who, upon the
deaths of her former owners, is documented to have been immediately enlisted
onto the public assistance roles of the local church (Baker 1978:5).
Based on this very brief and perfunctory survey of the historical
documentation concerning the economic status of African-Americans in New
England, it seems that the variable of impoverished economic means cannot be
separated methodologically from the condition of 18th- and 19th-century African
heritage. The co-variation of economics and race appears to be strong. As such,
the omission of these variables in the analysis of African-American ethnicity
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produces a significant bias which, ultimately, produces an indeterminate research
design when based on the hypothesis of a causal relationship between AfricanAmerican ethnicity and material culture.

Chapter VI. Ethnicity, Economics and W here to Go Next

That Lucy was black and that Lucy was poor is, for methodological
purposes, an inseparable co-variation; in fact, Lucy’s African identity may be
demonstrated to statistically predict her economic condition. Thus it seems that
John Otto’s original suggestion that differing economic conditions cause different
ceramic assemblage patterns was a more sound, and may be applicable more
appropriately to the ceramic pattern observed by Baker at Black Lucy’s Garden.
Some may object that the dismissal of the causal effect of AfricanAmerican ethnicity on archaeological patterning, a dismissal based on a proposed
co-variation of race and economics, is an etic and anthropologically-sterile point,
one that does not address the humanistic issues of how African-Americans viewed
their own lives and how, accordingly, they used their material culture. Yet as
historical archaeologists engaged in a discipline that demands a processual
approach to the past, an approach which concentrates explicitly on the voiceless
remains of archaeological assemblages and their reputed patterns, it is absolutely
critical that the construction and meanings of those patterns be based on thorough
contextual research and coherent, logically consistent social scientific theory
design. It is not African-American ethnicity that is being discarded, only the
72
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sloppy methodological use o f the concept. As Stine has commented
The complexities o f social and economic life need not be blurred by the use
o f imprecise concepts (Stine 1990:37).
As to the issue o f the analytically etic connection of racial background and
economic condition, there is tantalizing evidence to suggest that in some places
and at some times African-Americans may have connected their “ethnicity” with
their economic condition. During Gutman’s research of free and enslaved black
families in the South he came across the Petition o f Liberty County, a document
penned by freed Georgia blacks in 1865, in which they wrote
We cannot Labor fo r the Landowners... (while) our Infirm and Children are
not provided for... We are a Working Class o f People (Gutman 1976:185).
How intimately this community identified itself as an economic class is
difficult to assess; their motivations for creating this connection undoubtedly have
complicated political and social underpinnings and may be connected to an
instrumental ethnic strategy (Banks 1996:39. But the petition does represent an
interesting new avenue of anthropological and historical investigation, one in
which an African-American emic perspective on ethnic identification and
economic condition is paramount.
Although economic status is, theoretically, a more concrete, more
quantifiable condition than that of ethnicity, it is not an analytical panacea for
pattern analysis. Robert McGuire has gone so far as to assert that
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Economic status, since it results from material wealth, has great potential
fo r adding to the materials at a site and, a priori, should be considered the
dominant social dimension evident in the archaeological record o f domestic
dwellings in a single society or economic system (McGuire 1982:164,
emphasis added).
First and foremost, no element of social life should be allowed to take on
the proportions of an a priori assumption in social scientific theory, even one as
seductive as economics. Here, again, Hocart’s muse that specific cultural
preoccupations dominate the study o f culture itself takes on a peculiarly resonant
quality. A priori assumptions are fatal in social scientific research as they create
dogmatic, self-fulfilling theories and suffocate further hypothetical testing.
Second, and more pragmatically, McGuire’s assertion was effectively
invalidated two years later by, of all people, John Otto. In his research with G.D.
Gilbert of a “Plain Folk” cabin, the homestead of a prosperous late 19th-century
farming and blacksmithing family in Kentucky, Otto effectively deconstructed the
one-to-one correlation of economic wealth and material culture. Through
documentary research, Otto and Gilbert discovered that while the Hoover family,
the occupants of the plain folk site, were quite wealthy the majority of their wealth
was funneled into the purchase of additional acreage, not portable material items.
This “plain folk mentality”, one that emphasized the use of funds toward
investment in land rather than consumer goods, was passed from generation to
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generation and resulted, from an archaeological perspective, in misleadingly
modest material and architectural remains.
“Excavation of a ‘Plain Folk’ Log Cabin Site, Meade County, Kentucky
(Otto and Gilbert 1984:40-53), serves as a cautionary tale in the construction of
one-to-one correlations between any social variable and its observable implications
in the ground. Theories of this nature should be grounded properly in detailed,
historically-specific research, research that allows for the inclusion of a number of
explanatory variables. While South might view this concern with historical and
social specificity as overly-particularistic and “scientifically” meaningless, it is no
more than an attempt to construct a theory with the maximum amount of leverage,
an effort to feel out the interpretive parameters of a given theory through the
careful development of testable hypotheses.
In researching African-American ethnic identity it seems a mandatory pre
condition to deconstruct the concept of “ethnicity” altogether and approach it first
as a theoretical construct to be built from historically specific explanatory
variables. While low economic status appears to be a key variable in the
development of African-American ethnicity. Other variables such as geographic
location, the composition of the surrounding white environment, levels of political
activism or gender may provide their own suites of hypotheses concerning
ethnogenesis. Further, economic condition cannot and should not be viewed as
the primary factor in the investigation of African-American ethnic identity.
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Melvin Wade has commented that
Culture change... occurred as a consequence o f changes in the total
environment o f blacks and whites transplanted to New England; it cannot
ultimately be reduced to a simple equation based on the status o f the black
captives relative to the status o f those who held them captive (Wade
1988:176).
The process of teasing out “ethnicity” from the archaeological record
should be based on the intensive study of the “community relations” that formed
the environment in which people lived rather than the construction of “simple
dichotomies”(Stine 1990:41).
Marshall Sahlins has noted that
Any given intention may correspond to an indefinite set o f cultural
practices, and vice versa, since the intention is connected to the convention
by a relative and contextual scheme o f significances (Sahlins 197839).
Lucy Foster’s intentions, like those of enslaved Africans at Cannon’s Point
Plantation, were shaped by her experiences as an African living in America and
her interactions with the larger white community of which she was a part. To
reduce her identity to only its African components, as through the interpretation of
her ceramic assemblage, is to diminish her life and her struggle as an AfricanAmerican. Lucy Foster was not a cowrie shell, she was not a blue bead, and she
was not 40% serving bowls. She was a product, as are all individuals and groups,

of her environment. The “uniqueness” or “commonness” of Lucy’s condition as
an African-American and how that condition may or may not have revealed itself
in the archaeological record is best determined through a theoretically
circumscribed analysis tested through tightly constructed hypotheses. Only then
will Lucy Foster’s “African-American ethnicity” have true historical and,
hopefully, archaeological substance.

78
Bibliography

Armstrong, Douglas V. The Old Village and the Great House: An Archaeological
and Historical Examination of Drax Hall Plantation, St. Ann’s Bay,
Jamaica. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1990.

Baker, Vernon G. “Historical Archaeology at Black Lucy’s Garden, A ndover,
Massachussets: Ceramics from the Site of a Nineteenth-Century
Afro-American;” Papers of the Robert S. Peabody Foundation for
Archaeology 8 (1978).

Banks, Marcus. Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions. London: Routledge,
1996.

Baron, Donna Keith, J. Edward Hood and Holly V. Izard. “They Were Here All
Along: The Native American Presence in Lower-Central New England in
the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.” William and Mary Quarterly
LIII.3 (1996): 560-586.

Bamouw, Victor. Physical Anthropology and Archaeology. 5th ed. Chicago:
Dorsey Press, 1989.

Barth, Frederick. “Introduction.” Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social
Organization of Culture Difference. Ed. Frederick Barth. London:
George, Allen and Unwin, 1969. 17.

Blu, Karen L. The Lumbee Problem: The Making of an American Indian People.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

79

Bower, Beth Anne. “Material Culture in Boston: The Black Experience.” The
Archaeology of Inequality. Ed. R.H. McGuire and R. Paynter. Oxford:
Blackwell Press, 1991. 55-63.

Brown, Linda Keller and Kay Mussell. Ethnic and Regional Foodwavs in the
United States: The Performance of Group Identity. Knoxville: University
of Tennessee Press, 1984.

Bullen, Adelaide K. and Ripley P. “Black Lucy’s Garden.” Bulletin of the
Massachusetts Archaeological Society. 6. 2 (1945): 17-28.

Carlson, Claire C. and Eric Johnson, eds. Conference on New England
Archaeology Newsletter. 16 (1997)

Cohen, Abner. Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrant in
Yoruba Towns. London: Routledge, 1969.

Cromwell, Adelaide M. The Other Brahmins: Boston’s Black Upper Class.
Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1994.

Deetz, James. Flowerdew Hundred: The Archaeology of a Virginia Plantation,
1619- 1864. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993.

Epstein, A.L. Ethos and Identity: Three Studies in Ethnicity. London: Tavistock,
1978.

80

Fagan, Brian M. Archaeology: A Brief Introduction. 6th ed. New York:
Longman, 1997.

Ferejohn, John. “Structure and Ideology: Change in Parliament in Early Stuart
England.” Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and
Political Change. Ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert E. Keohane. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1993.

Ferguson, Leland. Uncommon Ground: Archaeology and Early African America,
1650-1800. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992.

Fitts, Robert K. “The Landscapes of Northern Bondage.” Historical Archaeology.
30.2 (1996): 54-73.

Goody, Jack. Cooking, Class and Cuisine: A Study in Comparative Sociology.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982

Gutman, Herbert G. The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925. New
York: Pantheon Books, 1976.

Hansen, Karen V. A Very Social Time: Crafting Community in Antebellum New
England. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

Hermstein, Richard J. and Charles Murray. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and
Class Structure in American Life. New York: Free Press, 1994.

81

Horton, James Oliver and Lois E. Black Bostonians: Family Life and Community
Struggle in the Antebellum North. New York: Holmes and Meier
Publishers, Inc., 1979.

Jeffreys, Harold. Theory of Probability. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961.

King, Gary, Robert E. Keohane and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry:
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1994.

Kruper, Adam and Jessica. The Social Science Encyclopedia. 2nd ed. London:
Routledge, 1996.

Leone, Mark and Parker B. Potter. The Recovery of Meaning. Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988.

Little, Barbara J. “People with History: An Update on Historical Archaeology in
the United States.” Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory 1. 1
(1994): 5-40.

McGuire, Randall. “The Study of Ethnicity in Historical Archaeology.” Journal
of Anthropological Archaeology 1 (1982): 159-178.

Meighan, Clement W. Archaeology: An Introduction. San Francisco: Chandler
Publishing Company, 1966.

82

Mouer, L. Daniel. “Chesapeake Creoles: The Creation of Folk Culture in Colonial
Virginia.” The Archaeology of 17th-Century Virginia. Ed. Theodore R.
Reinhart and Dennis Pogue. Richmond, VA: Spectrum Press, 1993. 105166.

Noel Hume, Ivor. Historical Archaeology. New York: Norton, 1975.

O ’Hear, Anthony. Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989.

Orser, Charles E. Jr. “On Plantations and Patterns.” Historical Archaeology. 23.
2 (1989): 28-40.

Otto, John Solomon. Cannon’s Point Plantation. 1794-1860: Living Conditions
and Status Patterns in the Old South. New York: Academic Press, Inc.,
1984.

“Artifact and Status Differences - A Comparison of Ceramics from
Planter, Overseer and Slave Sites on an Antebellum Plantation.” Research
f

Strategies in Historical Archaeology. Ed. Stanley South. New York:
Academic Press, 1977.

Otto, J.S. and G.D. Gilbert. “Excavation of a “Plain Folk” Cabin Site, Meade
County, Kentucky.” Filson Club History Quarterly. 58. 1 (1984): 4053.

Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

83

Piersen, William D. Black Yankees: The Development of an African-American
Subculture in Eighteenth-Century New England. Amherst, MA: University
of Massachussets Press, 1988.

Popper, Karl. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Harper & Row,
1968.

Posnansky, Merrick. “West-African Reflections on African-American
Archaeology.”Conference paper from Digging the Afro-American Past.
University of Mississippi, May 17-20, 1989.

Prown, Jules David. “Mind in Matter: An Introduction of Material Culture Theory
and Method.” Winterthur Portfolio. 17.1 (1982): 1-19.

Renfrew, Colin and Paul Bahn. Archaeology: Theories, Methods and Practice.
6th ed. London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1996.

Sahlins, Marshall. Perspectives on Ethnicity. Chicago: Aldine, 1978.

Sanford, Douglas. “Searching and “Researching” for the African-Americans of
18th-Century Virginia.” The Archaeology of 18th-Century Virginia. Ed.
Theodore R. Reinhart. Richmond, VA: Spectrum Press. 1996.

South, Stanley. “Whither Pattern?” Historical Archaeology. 22. 1 (1988): 2527.

Method and Theory in Historical Archaeology. Boston: Academic Press,
Inc., 1977.

84

Stine, Linda France. “Social Inequality and Tum-of-the-Century Farmsteads:
Issues of Class, Status, Ethnicity and Race.” Historical Archaeology. 24. 4
(1990): 37- 49.

Upton, Dell. “Ethnicity, Authenticity, and Invented Traditions.” Historical
Archaeology. 30. 2 (1996): 1-7.

.

Vlach, John Michael. “The Shotgun House: An African Architectural Legacy.”
Pioneer America: Journal of Historic American Culture. 8 (1976): 47-70.

Wade, Melvin. “Shining in Borrowed Plumage: Affirmation of Community in the
Black Coronation Festivals of New England, ca. 1750-1850.” Material Life
in America:

1600-1860. Ed. Robert Blair St. George. Boston:

Northeastern University Press, 1988. 171-182.

Warner, W. Lloyd and Paul S. Lunt. The Status System of a Modem
Community. New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1942.

Watson, Patty Jo, Steven A LeBlanc and Charles L. Redman. Archaeological
Explanation: The Scientific Method in Archaeology. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1984.

Weber, Max. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York: The Free
Press, 1949.

85

Williams, Brackette F. “O f Straightening Combs, Sodium Hydroxide, and
Potassium Hydroxide in Archaeological and Cultural-Anthropological
Analysis of Ethnogenesis.” American Antiquity. 57.4 (1992): 608-612.

Yelvington, Kevin A. “Ethnicity as Practice? A Comment on Bentley.”
Comparative Studies in Society and History 33.1 (1991): 158-168.

Yentsch, Anne E. A Chesapeake Family and Their Slaves: A Study in Historical
Archaeology. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Zierden, Martha and Jeanne Calhoun. “An Archaeological Assessment of the
Greenfield Borrow Pit, Georgetown County.” Archaeological
Contributions 4. Charleston, South Carolina:The Charleston Museum,
1983.

Zenner, Walter P. “Jewishness in America: Ascription and Choice.” Ethnicity
and Race in the U.S.A.: Toward the 21st Century. Ed. Richard D. Alba.
London: Routledge, 1985.

VITA

Kristen Barbara Heitert

Bom in Fairfax, Virginia, February 26, 1971. Graduated from the Norwich Free
Academy in Norwich, Connnecticut, June, 1989; Universtity of Connecticut, B.S.,
1993, with a dual degree in Anthropology and History. In September, 1994, the
author entered the College of William and Mary as a graduate student in the
Program in Anthropology.

